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The US economy is often considered to play a pivotal role in global growth.
Such a view has persisted despite the falling contribution of the US economy to
global growth (from almost 30% in 1950 to around 20% at present). In this paper,
we analyse the veracity of this conjecture and consider the implications of cyclical
developments in the US economy on the rest of the world. Overall we ﬁnd that while
US economic developments would indeed aﬀect the rest of the world, developments
in most countries and regions remain primarily aﬀected by idiosyncratic shocks as
well as by global factors, which do not originate from a single country.
Keywords: Business Cycle, Global VAR model, Markov-switching model, Fac-
tor models.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E32, E37, F41
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August 2007Non-technical summary
The US economy is often considered to play a pivotal role in global growth. Such a view
has persisted despite the falling contribution of the US economy to global growth (from
almost 30% in 1950 to around 20% at present). In this paper, we analyse the veracity
of this conjecture and consider the implications of a slowdown in the US economy on
the rest of the world. Overall we ﬁnd that while a slowdown in the US economy would
indeed negatively aﬀect the rest of the world, developments in most countries and regions
remain primarily aﬀected by idiosyncratic shocks as well as by global factors, which do
not originate from a single country.
In this paper, we go beyond the existing studies by considering, for a range of regions
of the world the following three aspects: (i) the magnitude and (ii) the speed at which
US shocks transmit to other parts of the world as well as (iii) the underlying causes of
the co-movements between the US and other regions.
Our main ﬁndings are:
• The US business cycle leads that of the other regions, except in the case of the
Asian region whose business cycle appears to have moved independently in the
past. The latter case is partly explained by the increasing contribution of China,
whose economic growth has largely remained independent of the economic cycles
of its main trading partners. The increasing trade integration within the region
may possibly also make the Asian economies more immune from developments in
the rest of the world.
• For all regions, except emerging Asia, linkages with the US appear stronger than
suggested by pure bilateral trade channels. In more detail, for the euro area it is
e s t i m a t e dt h a ta1p po fG D Pn e g a t i v eU Sd e m a n ds h o c kw o u l dd e c r e a s ee u r oa r e a
GDP by slightly over 0.25 pp while if we consider only bilateral trade relations it
would depress euro area GDP only by 0.1 pp.
• A negative shock to the US economy transmits faster than a positive one, with
a high US growth phase taking between 2 to 10 quarters to spill over and a low
g r o w t hp h a s eb e t w e e n1a n d3q u a r t e r s .
• Finally, looking at the factors aﬀecting regional developments, we conﬁrm the re-
sults of the existing literature in that common and country/region speciﬁcs h o c k s
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Many observers worry that when the US economy sneezes, the rest of the world catches
a cold. A quick glance at the data seems to provide some tentative support for this view
at least in the recent period, since the growth rates of the world excluding the US seem
to be moving similarly to the one of the US — albeit not in lockstep (see Figure 1).1 The
5-year rolling correlation between the US and the world’s GDP growth excluding the
US conﬁrms an increased importance of the US economy to the world’s business cycle
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Figure 1: US and world excluding US real GDP growth (top panel) and the 5 year
rolling correlation thereof (bottom panel)
Such strong comovements are diﬃcult to explain in terms of trade linkages alone.
Indeed, while trade integration and trade ﬂows have increased further globally, the
impact of trade developments on regions’ GDP growth remains too limited to explain
the recent global correlation between the US growth and the world’s GDP excluding
the US. New channels such as ﬁnancial or conﬁdence channels should have played an
important role. From a policy making perspective the ability to gauge the timing and
the magnitude of spillovers in economic activity across the various regions in the world
is of particular relevance as it contributes to better assess the developments in the own
domestic economy. It is therefore important to determine the speed and size of the
1Note that the negative correlation which occurred around 1998-1999 can at least partly be attributed
to the Asian crisis. Indeed, when considering rest of the world growth as measured by global growth
excluding US and non-Japan Asia, the correlation with US real GDP growth is no longer negative but
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August 2007spillovers that could occur following a shock originating from the US economy. For this
purpose, in this paper we examine the comovements between the US and the world
excluding the US over the past twenty-ﬁve years.3
In order to analyse the impact of US economic developments on the world excluding
the US, we review ﬁrst the empirical literature on the business cycle linkages between
the United States and the world excluding the US. Next, we present our own empirical
ﬁndings focussing on three aspects of the sensitivity of the global economy to the US
namely (i) the magnitude of the sensitivity of the global economy to US shocks, (ii) the
speed at which such US shocks are transmitted and (iii) the underlying causes of the
comovements between the US and the other regions. To quantify the sensitivity of the
global economy to the US we ﬁrst consider the trade linkages and integrate thereafter
other factors (such as ﬁnancial and conﬁdence channels) that may have inﬂuenced the
linkages. To gauge the overall eﬀect, we rely on a Global VAR model. This allows
us to consistently model interdepencies and measure them empirically. As regards the
speed of the shocks, we make use of a non-linear Markov-switching model. Such a
model is particularly useful as it enables us to determine not only whether or not the
US business cycle leads other regions’ cycle but it also allows for the possibility that
positive US shocks are transmitted at a diﬀerent speed than negative shocks. Finally,
to determine the causes of the linkages, a decomposition of the variance of GDP cycles
into three sources is provided (namely into common, spillover and idiosyncratic shocks)
by means of a Factor Structural VAR. We prefer this approach to alternatives, such as
decomposing business cycle ﬂuctuations into regional, global and idiosyncratic shocks as
we are mostly interested in the role of spillovers. In all cases, the analysis is performed for
seven regions of the world, namely the euro area, Japan, Latin America, Emerging Asia,
Other Developed Economies (Canada-Australia-New Zealand), the United Kingdom and
the Rest of Europe (Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark).
2R e v i e w o f e x i s t i n g ﬁndings and studies
International business cycle linkages have been the subject of a plethora of works using a
wide range of techniques going from calculating simply cross correlations to unobserved
components and dynamic factor models to uncover the characteristics as well as the
degree of synchronisation of economic activity ﬂuctuations in industrialised countries.
The earlier works — making mostly use of the cross correlations of real activity growth
rates — focussed on analysing the degree of integration between industrial economies. In
general, these studies found that albeit high, the correlation of growth rates among G7
economies has not increased over time, despite increased integration of the industrial
economies through more trade in goods and services and more global ﬁnancial markets
(see Doyle and Faust, 2002).
In order to explain the stable correlation despite the increased global integration,
a next strand of studies focussed on diﬀerent methodologies that allow for a distinc-
tion between movements in GDP driven by common factors and cross country spillover
eﬀects. In this vein, Stock and Watson (2003) use a structural VAR to identify com-
mon international shocks and the eﬀects of spillovers stemming from country-speciﬁco r
3We consider developments over the longest time period possible (namely from 1979Q1 to 2003Q4)
for which we have reliable data for the various regions of the world.
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August 2007idiosyncratic shocks. They conﬁrm that no increase in the synchronization of business
cycles among the G7 countries has been observed (over the period covering the 1960s
to the end of 2002). They explain this regularity by the fact that there has been a
decrease in the prominence and size of common shocks to the global economy. Interest-
ingly, however, correlations appear to have increased among English-speaking countries.
Commonality in cycles among Germany, France and Italy on the one hand and the US,
UK and Canada on the other hand is also found by Duarte and Holden (2003). They also
decompose real GDP of the G7 countries into cyclical and trend components and then
use the resulting series of cyclical components to identify static, long-run and short-run
relationships by using various statistical techniques. Using such techniques they found
commmonalities in cycles among Germany, France, Italy on the one hand and the US,
UK and Canada on the other hand.
Monfort et al. (2003) ﬁnd, by estimating a dynamic factor model for the G7 coun-
tries, that the output developments in G7 countries are driven to a substantial extent by
common shocks.4 As regards the main source of common shocks, the authors attribute
as i g n i ﬁcant role to oil price ﬂuctuations. Other similar decompositions have also been
presented by Canova and Marriman (1998), Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) and Kose
et al. (2003). All studies uncover the presence of a world business cycle which is an
important source of volatility for aggregates in most countries.
Beyond distinguishing between common and idiosyncratic shocks, the literature has
also devoted signiﬁcant attention to the importance and direction of spillover eﬀects.
Overall, a consensus appears to arise that spillover eﬀects tend to run from North Amer-
ica to the rest of the world but not in the opposite direction (see Dassel (2002), Monfort
et al. (2003) and Papanyan (2005) and Gianonne and Reichlin (2006)).5 Moreover,
Osborn et al. (2005) ﬁnd that lower growth regimes from the US seem to be more
readily transmitted to the other G7 countries than higher growth regimes. Mitra and
Sinclair (2006), by adopting a multivariate correlated unobserved components model,
ﬁnd however, that while linkages between the US and the UK and Canada are positive,
they could not ﬁnd such linkages between the US and European countries.
Taken together, the empirical literature suggests that a large role can be attributed
to common shocks in explaining the co-movement of business cycles and that spillovers,
if present, run from the US to the other countries but not in the opposite direction.
3 Measuring the size of the sensitivity of the global econ-
omy to US economic developments
As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on three aspects of the sensitivity of the
global economy to the United States, namely the magnitude, the speed and the un-
derlying causes. In this section, we use various methods to determine the ﬁrst aspect,
namely the magnitude of the sensitivity of the various regions in the global economy to
US developments. We focus hereby on demand shocks originating from the US and de-
4Giannone and Reichlin (2006) ﬁnd similar results when comparing the US and euro area cycles.
5An exception to these results can be found in Osborn, Perez and Artis (2006) who show that the
US economy has been increasingly aﬀected by external shocks, particularly those stemming from the
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also consider the extent to which these could be ampliﬁed through second-round and
third-country eﬀects. Second, we compare these trade eﬀects to the overall eﬀects that
account also for additional channels, such as ﬁnancial linkages. The latter is measured
by means of a global VAR model (GVAR) as estimated in Dees et al. (2007).
3.1 Trade eﬀects
3.1.1 Modelling direct trade eﬀects and "echo eﬀects"
The calculations of trade eﬀects are based on the assumptions that economic policies do
not lean against the demand shocks and that all prices and exchange rates are ﬁxed6.
Consequently, the multipliers represent the short-term responses of the world economy
and are not relevant concerning long term impacts. We compute ﬁrst direct trade eﬀects,
which are related to the eﬀects only channeled by bilateral trade relationships between
the countries where the shock originates and its trade partners. In a second step, we
compute "echo eﬀects" (or indirect trade eﬀect), which involve the third markets trade
channels7. In other words, we try to measure how the response of exports and imports in
third markets ampliﬁes the transmission of demand shock from one country to another.
The external trade transmission of a foreign domestic demand shock to country j,
(j =1 ,...,N) depends on three factors.




the respective shares of domestic demand, exports and imports.




• The geographical breakdown of exports. We denote xji exports of country j to
country i as a share of country j exports.
For each country j, the response of GDP b yj (as a percentage point of baseline) to a
domestic demand shock b εj and to exports ﬂuctuations b xj is given by
b yj = µjXY











is the traditional Keynesian multiplier.
If exports remain constant, a 1% point of GDP shock on domestic demand ex ante
leads to µj% increase in GDP ex post. This corresponds to the output multiplier of a
domestic demand shock in a small open economy for which the rest of the world can
be considered exogenous. Similarly, if total exports move up by 1%, GDP increases by
µjXY
j %.
6This ceteris paribus condition allows us to only capture pure trade volume eﬀects.
7This third market eﬀect is therefore not comparable with the third markets competitive pressure
measured by the double weighting scheme used to compute eﬀective exchange rates. These latter
static indicators weight the average market share of a trade partner on third markets by the exports
geographical structure of the country under competition: this is meant to assess the impact on total
price competitiveness of ﬂuctuations in any trade partner prices.
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i b yi (2)
Stacking equation (1) for all the N countries, we obtain the following matrix repre-
sentation:
b Y = Xb Y +b ε (3)











with of course xjj =0 .
From equation (3), we can derive two indicators of direct and indirect trade eﬀects
of domestic demand shocks.
The direct trade eﬀects of 1 pp of GDP shocks within the main countries/regions
of the world are given by the matrix X.
More precisely, the bilateral trade impact of a shock in country i to country j is
given by µjXY
j xjiαM
i . 1 pp of GDP increase in country i stimulates imports demand up
to αM
j %, which then increases country j exports by xjiαM
i %. Higher exports translates
into GDP improvement in country j with the output multiplier µjXY
j .
The full transmission of shocks including the “echo eﬀect” is otherwise taken
from the matrix (I − X)
−1.
3.1.2 Empirical results
The calibration of the parameters used to compute the direct trade eﬀects as well as
the "echo eﬀects" is presented in Table 2. The bilateral trade matrix used is reported
in Table 1.
Table 1: Trade Weights Based on Direction of Trade Statistics
US EA JP UK Rest Eur ODE Em Asia Lat Am Rest*
US 0 0.192 0.122 0.062 0.029 0.256 0.182 0.149 0.008
EA 0.174 0 0.052 0.255 0.218 0.039 0.132 0.038 0.092
Japan 0.327 0.147 0 0.037 0.019 0.052 0.395 0.019 0.004
UK 0.140 0.602 0.028 0 0.085 0.043 0.074 0.010 0.018
Rest Eur 0.082 0.503 0.034 0.112 0.144 0.027 0.061 0.013 0.024
ODE 0.540 0.068 0.140 0.034 0.011 0.013 0.179 0.011 0.004
Em Asia 0.236 0.190 0.150 0.057 0.022 0.041 0.271 0.014 0.019
Lat Am. 0.449 0.203 0.053 0.024 0.015 0.037 0.073 0.133 0.013
Note: Trade weights are computed as shares of exports and imports displayed in rows by region such
that a row, but not a column, sums to one. *”Rest” gathers the remaining countries. The complete
trade matrix used in the GVAR model is given in a Supplement that can be obtained from the authors
on request. Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, 1999-2001, IMF.
The direct trade eﬀects (Table 3) beneﬁt mostly the main trading partners of the
US economy, namely Other Developed Economies (ODE), emerging Asia and Latin
America. The size of the direct eﬀect is small for the euro area and the UK and marginal
for the rest of Europe. However, the impact of changes in US economic conditions on
10
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US 0.11 0.14 0.6 2.1 1.4
EA 0.17 0.14 0.6 2.0 1.5
Japan 0.11 0.08 0.6 1.3 2
UK 0.27 0.29 0.6 1.9 1.1
Rest Eur 0.46 0.41 0.6 1.3 1.1
ODE 0.35 0.33 0.6 1.6 1.1
Em Asia 0.42 0.39 0.6 1.3 1.1





j )is the share of exports (imports) in GDP computed from national
accounts data (sources: OECD and national sources). α
DD
j is the elasticity of
domestic demand to GDP. It is assumed to be equal to 0.6. This calibration results
in values for µj,t h eK e y n e s i a nm u l t i p l i e r ,w h i c hi si nar a n g ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hm o s t
macroeconometric models. α
M
j is the elasticity of imports to GDP. The values are
estimates of long-term elasticities to GDP in standard import demand equations,
including real GDP and competitiveness indicators (estimation over the period
1980-2003).
Table 3: Trade impacts of a US domestic demand shock (by 1 p.p. of GDP) on GDP
of other countries in percent/regions
Countries/regions Direct trade eﬀect Trade eﬀect incl. echo eﬀect








Emerging Asia 0.20 0.37
[0.13-0.22] [0.22-0.42]






Note: The point estimates of the trade eﬀects (direct and incl. echo eﬀect) corre-
spond to the benchmark parameterisation reported in Table 2. The ranges have
been computed as min-max intervals of alternative calibration for α
DD
j (the elastic-
ity of domestic demand to GDP), varying between 0.5 and 0.7 and α
M
j (elasticity
o fi m p o r t st oG D P ) ,v a r y i n gb e t w e e n1a n d2 . 5
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second-round and third-country eﬀects). In particular, higher import demand from the
US also beneﬁts the exports of other countries which thereafter are expected to increase
their imports. The dynamics created likewise produces an “echo eﬀect” that propagates
to the whole world economy. Once the “echo eﬀect” is taken into account, the output
elasticities to US demand changes increase, especially in countries and regions where the
direct eﬀect was the lowest. For the euro area and the UK, this elasticity is multiplied
by 2. For the rest of Europe, the impact including the “echo eﬀect” is 5 times higher
than the direct one.
Table 3 also includes ranges in order to assess the sensitivity of the results to the
calibration for αDD
j (the elasticity of domestic demand to GDP), varying between 0.5
and 0.7 and αM
j (elasticity of imports to GDP), varying between 1 and 2.5. Qualitatively,
the results are robust to the calibration chosen. The benchmark values tend to be closer
to the upper part of the range as the estimated value for αM
j - which seems to matter
the most - is generally close or higher than 2.
3.2 Overall eﬀects
3.2.1 The GVAR model
In order to account for channels additional to trade, such as ﬁnancial linkages, price
adjustments and economic policy reactions, we use a global VAR model (GVAR) as
estimated in Dees et al. (2007).
The GVAR approach consists of specifying and estimating a set of country-speciﬁc
vector error-correcting models that are consistently combined to generate a global model
that can be simultaneously solved for all the variables in the world economy. This ap-
proach addresses the problem of consistently modelling interdependencies among many
economies through the construction of “foreign” variables, which are included in each
individual country model. Thus, each country model includes domestic variables plus
variables obtained from the aggregation of data on the foreign economies using weights
derived from trade statistics. Because the set of weights for each country reﬂects its
speciﬁc geographical trade composition, foreign variables vary across countries. Sub-
ject to appropriate testing, the country-speciﬁc foreign variables are treated as weakly
exogenous during the estimation of the individual country models.
Suppose that there are N +1countries indexed by i =0 ,1,...,N,w i t hi =0for the
US, the numeraire country. The GVAR can be written as the collection of individual
country VAR(pi,q i) models:
Φi (L,pi)xit = ai0 + ai1t + Υi (L,qi)dt + Λi (L,qi)x∗
it + uit,( 4 )
where xit is the ki×1 (with ki usually ﬁve or six) vector of modelled variables, dt is the
vector of observed international variables common to all countries, and x∗
it is the k∗
i ×1
vector of foreign variables speciﬁct oc o u n t r yi. Φi (L,pi) and Λi (L,qi) are the ki × ki
and ki ×k∗
i matrix polynomials in the lag operator L of the coeﬃcients of the domestic
and country-speciﬁc foreign variables, respectively. ai0 and ai1 are the ki ×1 vectors of
coeﬃcients of the deterministic variables, here intercepts and linear trends. Υi (L,pi)
is the ki × kd matrix polynomial of coeﬃcients of the international variables dt. uit is
a ki × 1 vector of idiosyncratic country-speciﬁcs h o c k s .
12
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it as
weakly exogenous, which is compatible with a certain degree of weak dependence across
uit.8 The country-speciﬁc foreign variables x∗
it are constructed as country-speciﬁct r a d e -





wijxjt, with wii =0 ,( 5 )
where wij is the share of country j in the trade (exports plus imports) of country
i.9
After selecting the lag length-order pi and qi for each country by means of the Akaike
Information Criterion (allowing for a maximum lag-order of 2), the VAR(pi,q i) models
are estimated separately for each country, allowing for the possibility of cointegration
among xit , x∗
it and dt.
Once the individual country models are estimated, all the k =
PN
i=0 ki endogenous




solved simultaneously. To do this (4) can be written as
Ai(L,pi,q i)zit = ϕit, for i =0 ,1,2,...,N (6)
where







ϕit = ai0 + ai1t + Υi (L,qi)dt + uit.
Let p =m a x ( p0,p 1,...,p N,q 0,q 1,...,q N) and construct Ai(L,p) from Ai(L,pi,q i) by
augmenting the p−pi or p−qi additional terms in powers of L by zeros. Also note that
zit = Wixt, i =0 ,1,2,...,N,( 7 )
where Wi is a (ki + k∗
i) × k matrix, deﬁned by the country speciﬁc weights, wji.
With the above notations (6) can be written equivalently as
Ai(L,p)Wixt = ϕit,i =0 ,1,...,N,
a n dt h e ns t a c kt oy i e l dt h eV A R ( p)m o d e li nxt:

























The GVAR(p) model (8) can now be solved recursively and used for forecasting or
generalized impulse response analysis in the usual manner.
8For further details see DdPS.
9See Appendix 1 for more details on the computation of the trade-based weights.
13
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of the 11 countries that originally joined Stage Three of European Monetary Union
on 1 January 1999 are grouped together, while the remaining 25 countries are mod-
eled individually.10 The present GVAR model, therefore, contains 26 countries/regions
estimated over the sample period 1979(2)-2003(4).
The endogenous variables included in the GVAR, when available, are the logarithm
of real output (yit); the rate of quarterly inﬂation (πit = pit − pit−1),w i t hpit the log-
arithm of a domestic price index; the real exchange rate (eit − pit),w i t heit the log-
arithm of the nominal exchange rate against the dollar; the logarithm of real equity
prices (qit); a short-term interest rate
¡
ρS
it =0 .25 × ln(1 + RS
it/100)
¢
,w h e r eRS
it is a
short annualised rate of interest measured in percent; and a long-term interest rate ¡
ρL
it =0 .25 × ln(1 + RL
it/100)
¢
,w h e r eRL
it is a long-term annualised rate of interest (typ-
ically a long-term government bond yield) measured in percent. The time series data for
the euro area were constructed as cross section weighted averages of yit,πit,q it,ρ S
it,ρ L
it
over Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland, using
average Purchasing Power Parity GDP weights over the 1999-2001 period.
The vector of common international variables dt includes only the logarithm of oil
prices. With the exception of the US model, all individual models include the country-





it and oil prices (po
t). Based on the results of
appropriate tests, these variables are included as weakly exogenous. The speciﬁcation
of the US model diﬀers from that of the other countries in that oil prices are included as





included as weakly exogenous foreign variables. The endogeneity of oil prices reﬂects
the large size of the US economy. The omission of q∗
US,t, R∗S
US,t and R∗L
US,t from the vector
of US-speciﬁc foreign ﬁnancial variables reﬂects the results of tests showing that these
variables are not weakly exogenous with respect to the US domestic ﬁnancial variables,
in turn reﬂecting the importance of the US ﬁnancial markets within the global ﬁnancial
system.
3.3 Comparing trade and overall eﬀects
The overall eﬀe c t so faU Sd e m a n ds h o c ko nt h er e s to ft h ew o r l da r ed e r i v e du s i n gt h e
GVAR model decribed above. The model has 134 endogenous variables, 71 stochastic
trends and 63 cointegrating relations. All the roots of the GVAR either lie on or inside
the unit circle. The long-run forcing assumption is rejected only in ﬁve out of 153
cases. Dees et al. (2007) report the results for various tests of structural stability,
the critical values of which are computed using the sieve bootstrap samples obtained
from the solution of the GVAR. Evidence of structural instability is found primarily
in the error variances (47 per cent of the equations–clustered in the period 1985—92).
Although linear with a simple overall structure, this is a large and complicated model
that allows for a high degree of interdependence. There are three routes for between-
country interdependence: through the impact of the x∗
it variables, oil prices and the
error covariances. The eﬀects through the x∗
it are generally large; shocks to one country
have marked eﬀects on other countries. Table 4 reports the GVAR mean estimates of a
1 pp positive shock to US GDP on the rest of the countries In addition to these point
10See Dees et al. (2007) for the list of modelled countries. Although not all the euro area countries
are modelled, the 8 countries included provide a fairly extensive coverage of the euro area economy.
14
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the ranges are not comparable to the ranges provided in Table 3, they provide measures
of uncertainty.
Table 4: Overall impacts of a US domestic demand shock (by 1 p.p. of GDP) on GDP
of other countries/regions (error bounds into brackets) in percent

















Note: GVAR bootstrap mean estimates after 3 years. The ranges correspond to
the 90 percent bootstrap error bounds.
The GVAR results show in most countries a higher sensitivity of their output to a
shock originating in the US compared with the purely trade-related eﬀects. The point
estimates are in most cases higher than the benchmark values for trade-related eﬀects
(Figure 2). For the euro area and Latin America, the eﬀect of a US domestic demand
shock is around 2.5 times the one based on direct trade eﬀects. It is slightly less (around
1.5) in the case of Japan and Other Developed Economies and it is above 5 for the rest of
Europe. Interestingly, the GVAR-implied elasticity of the UK and emerging Asia is very
close to the direct trade eﬀect and below the total trade eﬀect. For emerging Asia, this
result might be due to diﬀerent factors. First, the Chinese economy, which represents
almost half of the region’s output, has remained relatively immune to world economic
developments and is providing increasingl yas t r o n gi m p e t u st ot h er e g i o na saw h o l e .
Second, since the sample used to estimate the GVAR model includes the Asian crisis, it
is likely that the results are inﬂuenced by this episode, which did not originate from a
US shock. Finally, a large share of emerging Asian trade is related to processing trade,
whose contribution to overall GDP is lower than traditional trade (when export demand
for ﬁnal Asian products decrease, the Asian imports of the corresponding intermediate
goods also decrease leading to a broadly neutral impact on the net trade contribution
to growth).
Overall, we ﬁnd that a 1 percentage point positive shock in the United States would
result in an increase in the GDP of the other regions in the world via the trade channel
15
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Trade effect incl. echo effect
GVAR
Figure 2: The eﬀects of a US domestic demand shock (by 1 p.p. of GDP) on GDP of
other countries/regions (in percent)
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ered. Including also other channels this range would be much higher, namely between
0.2 and 0.7 pp.
4 Measuring the speed of spillover transmission from the
US to the world excluding the US
Not only the overall sensitivity but also the speed at which developments in the US busi-
ness cycle spill over to the world excluding the US may inﬂuence global developments.
Our analysis shows that the US business cycle leads that of the other regions, except in
the case of the Asian region whose business cycle appears to have moved independently.
To derive these results, we make use in this section of a non-linear Markov-switching
model, similar to Philips (1991). In a nutshell, the analysis consists of estimating
a two-region Markov-switching time series model for the US and each of the other
region/country’s real GDP growth. Within the model, there are two possible states for
each country, i.e. a high and a low growth state. The correlation of business cycles
across the two regions will then aﬀect the probability that each region switches from
high to low growth regimes. While providing a historical insight into the degree and
direction of business cycle synchronisation, it should be stressed however, that such a
m o d e lc a n n o ta t t e m p tt oe x p l a i nt h ee c o n o m i cf o r c e sa tw o r ki nt h et r a n s m i s s i o no ft h e
business cycle. Rather, it attempts to characterize the behaviour of the economies.
We estimate the following two-country Markov-switching model:
yt = nt + εt (10)
nt = µ1s1t + µ2s2t + µ3s3t + µ4s4t (11)
where sit =1i fs t a t ea td a t et is i and otherwise it equals 0. The equation moreover
allows the error term to be vector-autocorrelated. There are two possible states for each
country (a high and a low growth state); the four diﬀerent combinations of these will
be the four diﬀerent states in the Markov process. In general, we can describe them as
follows. State 1: both countries are in high growth. State 2: the home country is in
low growth while the foreign country is in high growth. State 3: the home country has
high growth and the foreign has low. State 4: both countries have low growth. This
convention gives the following values to the four µ vectors (whereby h represents the




































where µ1 >µ 2 for both countries.
In this model the correlation of business cycles across countries is measured through
the nature of the transition matrix (see Philips (1991)). For our speciﬁcM a r k o v -
switching model the transition matrix for the Markov process is a four-by-four matrix of
probabilities, πij,w h e r eπij =P r( st = j|st−1 = i). These probabilities must then sum
up to one over j for each i.
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four-state transmission matrix will look like the following:
⎡
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(12)
By contrast, if the two Markov processes are perfectly correlated, then they could
be represented by a two-by-two transition matrix. In this case, the four-by-four matrix




π11 00( 1 − π11)
−− −−
−− −−




In this case, the values in the second and third row are irrelevant since these states
never occur.
The transition matrix can also allow for cases where one country leads the other.
For example, suppose the foreign country is always in the same state the home country
was in last year. This would be the case where the home country leads the foreign
























A similar matrix can be constructed for the case where the foreign country leads. It
is also possible to allow for expected leads of longer than one period. The matrix below
illustrates a case where the expected length of the home country’s lead into low growth
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From the above we can see that a great variety of cross-country business cycle
transmissions can occur. One possibility that is rather diﬃcult to model, however, is
the case where two countries alternate their leads into and out of recessions. If the
home country is a clear leader (as in the case illustrated above), one state will always be
followed by the same other state. However, if the two countries alternate leads, then this
would not be the case. The result is owing to the fact that the Markov process is ﬁrst-
order; only last period’s state is allowed to inﬂuence the determination of this period’s.
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will be necessary to look not only at the transition matrix, but also at the smoothed
probabilities that generate the estimates. This will show how the states actually evolve
over time.11
The Markov-switching model with any of these transition matrices can then be
estimated. The model that provides the highest likelihood ratio then presents the most
appropriate speciﬁcation.
The model is estimated for each of the regions/countries under scrutiny and the
US (i.e. US-euro area, US-Japan, US-Latin America, etc.). We allow for two possible
model setups namely: (i) the business cycles are uncorrelated or (ii) the US leads the
cycle of the other region.12 In the latter case, we can estimate by how many quarters
the US leads the cycle of the other region during an upturn and of a downturn. The
results are reported in Table 5. A number of common ﬁndings emerge. First, for all
the regions considered except the Asian region (i.e. Japan13 and emerging Asia), the
likelihood ratio test reveals that the scenario that the US and the other region/country’s
cycle are independent can be rejected in favour of the hypothesis that the US leads the
cycle of the other country/region. Second, in general, we ﬁnd that US downturns are
transmitted faster to the world excluding the US than upturns. It takes between 1 and
3 quarters for a downturn in the US to transmit to the other region/country whereas
it takes between 2 and 10 quarters for an upturn to spillover. Spillovers from the US
occur fastest into Latin America whereas they take longest to materialise into the rest of
Europe. A similar ﬁnding is reported in IMF (2007) where spillovers to Latin America
(and Canada) from US shocks are fatest and strongest. These results were obtained from
a panel analysis as well as a cross-country and cross-region set of vector autoregression
models. However, in contrast to our ﬁndings, the authors do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant spillover
from US developments to Newly Industrialised Countries and the ASEAN-4 countries.
However, the eﬀect found is short-lived and relatively muted. Such a diﬀerence with our
ﬁnding may arise not only from a diﬀerent deﬁnition of the region but also a diﬀerent
time-period and estimation technique.
5 Determining the sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations
In order to understand the factors that could explain the above discussed results, in
this last section, we estimated a Factor-Structural VAR model for the main countries
and regions and decompose the variance of GDP growth into three sources of shocks,
namely idiosyncratic, global and spillovers.
11In our case, an inspection of the smoothed probabilities revealed in no case that the lead and lagging
country switched.
12Estimating the model allowing for the two cases enables to verify if the model that the US leads
the cycle of the other region has a log-likelihood which is signiﬁcantly higher than the model where the
cycles are uncorrelated. If this is not the case, it is unclear whether the US indeed leads the cycle of
the other region.
13For Japan, other studies also have documented its stronger independence from the US business
cycle (see for instance Osborn et al, 2003).
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Country/region Uncorrelated versus US lead Number of quarters US leads
Low growth High growth
US - euro area 35.94* 2 7
US - Japan 3.65 — —
US - UK 34.89* 2 2
US - Emerging Asia 5.96 — —
US - Other Dev. Eco. 40.98* 2 4
US - Latin America 47.27* 1 2
US - Rest of Europe 67.02* 3 10
Note: The null hypothesis for the test is that the cycles are uncorrelated. The test is a likelihood
ratio test with a X
2 distribution. * indicates that the null (of no correlation) can be rejected at 99%
conﬁdence.
5.1 A Factor Structural VAR
The Factor-Structural VAR (FSVAR) estimated here follows Stock and Watson (2003)
and has the following form:

















where ft are the common international factors, Γ is the 7 × k matrix of factor
loadings, and ξt are the country-speciﬁc, or idiosyncratic, shocks. In equation (17), the
common international shocks (the common factors) are identiﬁed as those shocks that
aﬀect output in multiple countries contemporaneously. We estimate the FSVAR using
Gaussian maximum likelihood.
5.2 Sources of business cycles ﬂuctuations
We present here the decomposition of the variance of the 4-quarter ahead forecast error
for GDP growth. We distinguish three potential sources: unforeseen common shocks,
unforeseen domestic shocks, and spillover eﬀects of unforeseen domestic shocks to other
countries. In this context, common shocks are deﬁned as those that aﬀect all coun-
tries within the same period. Country-speciﬁc shocks can lead to spillovers, but those
spillovers are assumed to happen with at least a one-quarter lag.14 Further, we con-
sider developments during two diﬀerent sub-periods: 1979-1992 (Table 6) and 1992-2003
(Table 7). The second column of the table presents the standard deviation of the four-
quarter ahead forecast errors in a given region. In most country (except in Japan and
Latin America), this standard deviation decreased in the second sub-period compared
with the ﬁrst one. This result is in line with the observed decrease in output growth
14A potential disadvantage of this approach is that if an international shock aﬀects several countries
only with a lag, that eﬀect may incorrectly be interpreted as a spillover.
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alia by weaker international shocks as well as key structural changes (such as new stock
management methods and more credible monetary policy). The next three columns of
Tables 6 and 7 display the fraction of the forecast error variance for GDP growth due to
each of the three potential sources of shocks. In general, we ﬁnd that spillovers appear
to play only a secondary role in determining regions’ GDP developments relative to
idiosyncratic and common shocks.
Table 6: Variance decomposition of GDP growth based on a Factor-Structural VAR
Model: common shocks, own country-shocks, and spillovers (1979-1992)
Country/region Error s.d. Fraction due to
Common shocks Idiosyncratic shocks Spillovers
US 1.46 0.48 0.22 0.3
Euro area 0.73 0.72 0.1 0.18
Japan 1 0.28 0.6 0.12
U.K. 1.16 0.25 0.6 0.15
Emerging Asia 1.64 0.08 0.81 0.11
Other Dev. Eco. 1.55 0.68 0.14 0.18
Latin America 0.84 0.51 0.24 0.25
Rest of Europe 1.46 0.48 0.22 0.3
Note: The entries in the second column are the standard deviation of the four quarter ahead forecast
errors in a given region.
Table 7: Variance decomposition of GDP growth based on a Factor-Structural VAR
Model: common shocks, own country-shocks and spillovers (1992-2003)
Country/region Error s.d. Fraction due to
Common shocks Idiosyncratic shocks Spillovers
US 0.76 0.38 0.5 0.12
Euro area 0.69 0.53 0.4 0.06
Japan 1.1 0.23 0.44 0.33
U.K. 0.55 0.49 0.48 0.03
Emerging Asia 1.06 0.16 0.75 0.09
Other Dev. Eco. 0.73 0.55 0.15 0.3
Latin America 2.06 0.19 0.52 0.29
Rest of Europe 0.59 0.59 0.33 0.08
Note: The entries in the second column are the standard deviation of the four quarter ahead forecast
errors in a given region.
In more detail, the results conﬁrm our ﬁndings from the previous subsection by
showing that emerging Asia tends to be mostly aﬀected by regional shocks, while com-
mon shocks and spillover eﬀects remain relatively limited. In addition, IMF (2007)
reports a similar ﬁnding, namely that regional factors are important for Asia – which
in the case of IMF (2007) includes both Emerging Asia and Japan –, when decom-
posing business cycle ﬂuctuations into common, regional, national and idiosyncractic
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August 2007factors.15 Also Kim et al (2003) note the importance of a regional cycle in Asia whereas
Yamagata (1998) stresses the absence of contemporaneous co-movement between the
US and Asian business cycle, however the author does note that there seems to be a
lagged spillover from the US to the Asian business cycle.
In contrast to the ﬁndings for Asia, the developed economies (the euro area, ODE
and Rest of Europe) are less aﬀected by domestic shocks but appear more sensitive
to common shocks. Spillover eﬀects explain almost 1/3 of the variance in the case of
ODE, Latin America and Japan, while they are relatively limited in the other countries
and regions. Finally, the euro area seems to be more aﬀected by common shocks than
idiosyncratic shocks, while it tends to be the opposite in the US case. Compared to the
period 1979-92, the most recent period shows an increase in the role of idiosyncratic
shocks as opposed to spillovers or common shocks for the US, the euro area and the
rest of Europe. Conversely, for Japan the role of spillover eﬀects has increased as the
expense of idiosyncratic and common shocks.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have analysed the implications of a slowdown in the US economy on
the world excluding the US. Our main ﬁndings are:
(i) The US business cycle leads that of the other regions, except in the case of the
Asian region whose business cycle has been moving independently.
(ii) For all regions, except emerging Asia, linkages with the US appeared stronger
than suggested by pure bilateral trade channels. In more detail, for the euro area it is
estimated that a 1 pp of GDP positive US demand shock would increase euro area GDP
by slightly over 0.25 pp while based on bilateral trade relations it would raise euro area
GDP only by 0.1 pp.
(iii) In terms of timing, for all regions, a negative shock to the US economy has been
transmitting faster than a positive one, with a high US growth phase taking between 2
to 10 quarters and a low growth phase between 1 and 3 quarters to spillover.
(iv) Finally, looking at the factors aﬀecting regional developments, common and
country/region speciﬁc shocks appeared to have played a larger role in determining GDP
ﬂuctuations than spillovers do. This ﬁnding would suggest that although a downturn
in the US would indeed negatively aﬀect the world excluding the US, country speciﬁc
and global factors continue to dominate the outlook.
15They contrast however with the ﬁndings reported by IMF (2007) using the calibrated Global Econ-
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